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ABSTRACT. Public debate on acceptable farm animal husbandry suﬀers from a
confusion of tongues. To clarify positions of various stakeholder groups in their
joint search for acceptable solutions, the concept of animal welfare was split up
into three notions: no suﬀering, respect for intrinsic value, and non-appalling
appearance of animals. This strategy was based on the hypothesis that multi-
stakeholder solutions should be based on shared values rather than on compro-
mises. The usefulness of such an artiﬁcial value distinction strategy was tested in a
small series of experiments. The results demonstrate that the chosen concept to
distinguish between values is eﬀective in a stakeholder context. Farmers’ views on
doing good to animals appeared to be largely based on their value to prevent
suﬀering and predominantly focused on the provision of regular care. Their pri-
ority for this value is clearly shared with other stakeholders, providing a basis for
joint solutions. The concept of intrinsic value does not play a discernable role in
farmers’ considerations. Based on the varying views on welfare, it can be inferred
that there is a gradual rather than a principal diﬀerence between government
legislation and farmers’ values, whereas public perception and acceptance of farm
practices remains complicated. Distinction between value groups and focusing on a
selected notion (such as no suﬀering) proved to be eﬀective in bringing represen-
tatives of stakeholder groups together, but is unlikely to bridge the emotional gap
between commercial farm practices and public ideals.
KEY WORDS: Animal welfare, farmer ethics, interactive design, intrinsic value,
stakeholder views
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Animal welfare is a key issue in society’s unease about practices in intensive
animal production. Various eﬀorts have been made to design acceptable
production systems in cooperation with science and stakeholders. However,
in such multi-actor environments, the risk of confusion of tongues is con-
siderable.
A small series of actor-involved studies was performed to determine
whether such misunderstandings could be reduced by explicitly addressing
the values underpinning the perceptions of animal welfare. The assumption
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was made that minimizing the suﬀering of farm animals is a widely
shared value and that addressing this shared value would provide an
opportunity for calming the societal unease. A further assumption pin-
points two other important values: the notion of respecting the intrinsic
value of animals and the notion of non-appalling appearance. These three
values form a hierarchical three-notion concept. This paper describes an
empirical experimental approach of these notions of animal welfare val-
ues. To begin with a visualization of the diﬀerent views is presented
through caricatures of the welfare views of the key actors. Then a test is
described of the ﬁrst notion (minimization of suﬀering) in a multi-
stakeholder environment followed by details of an exploration of the
second notion (intrinsic value) among farmers’ groups. In the summing
up are comments on the applicability of the key values in multi-stake-
holder processes. The third notion – attractive appearance – will not be
worked out in this paper.
2. CARICATURE OF THE CONFUSION OF TONGUES
ON ANIMAL WELFARE
Arguments around the public debate on farm animal welfare vary
widely. Public ideals were characterized by Beekman et al. (2003) by the
words ‘‘straw, space and outdoor access.’’ Based on the studies de-
scribed below, farmers’ views on good animal welfare can be described
as the animals receiving good care. Animal welfare scientists generally
focus on biological normal functioning. Animal protection organizations
strive towards combining a good life for the individual animal with the
policy that animals should be kept in an environment that is as natural
as possible (Verhoog, 2000). The caricaturing may be summed up as
follows:
• Farmers focus on regular care based on habit and good intentions
• Scientists focus on biological parameters
• The public focuses on icons like space, straw, and outdoor access
• Animal protection organizations combine animal nature and maximal
care
These caricatures are predominantly based on Beekman et al. (2003);
Bracke et al. (2004); results of the studies discussed below (De Greef et al.,
2004; Staﬂeu et al., 2004), and information from the EU-wide integrated
project Welfare Quality (Welfare Quality, 2004).
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3. A SIMPLE HIERARCHICAL THREE-NOTION CONCEPT
OF ANIMAL WELFARE
3.1. Three-Notion Concept: No suﬀering, Intrinsic value, and Non-Appalling
Appearance
Despite the principally diﬀerent positions, stakeholder groups seem to
commonly strive towards a good life for farm animals. The shared value
among stakeholders of doing good to animals can be summed up as:
‘‘animals should not suﬀer.’’ Other values that play a role in dealing with
animals can be divided up into two more key notions: respecting the
intrinsic value of animals; and meeting the needs of the (human) observers
(it should look nicely). See Figure 1.
These notions are not fully orthogonal but are complementary so their
hierarchical order should be taken into account. Once the requirements
covering the ﬁrst notion have been met, the other aspects remain. The
second notion (respect for intrinsic value) simply follows-on from the ﬁrst
notion, such as the plea for some degree of naturalness is additional to the
inherent needs of the animals. The reasoning behind this is that animals
themselves long for satisfaction of their biological needs rather than strive
for naturalness. The plea for naturalness is of human origin, based on our
view that animals are creatures that belong in a speciﬁc (natural) context.
The third notion embellishes the ﬁrst two notions. A non-appalling or
pleasant appearance may be independent of what is good for the quality of
life for the animal itself and what is thought ‘‘normal’’ for animals. We like
to see animals grazing in the pasture, but this does not mean that animals
kept indoors are suﬀering.
Figure 1. Deduction of motives around dealing with farm animals from the
perspective of ‘‘doing good to animals.’’
SIMPLE VALUE-DISTINCTION APPROACH AIDS TRANSPARENCY 59
4. NO SUFFERING AS A SHARED VALUE TESTED IN A DESIGN
STUDY
The no suﬀering notion was tested in a multi-stakeholder project created in
response to society’s unease about practices in intensive animal production.
A research program was initiated to work on systems innovations in an
interactive (stakeholder involved) and interdisciplinary way (see Grin et al.,
2004). An interdisciplinary group was formed to formulate requirements for
future pig production systems that meet societal demands, singly with re-
gard to animal ‘‘welfare’’ (De Greef et al., 2003). The term ‘‘animal welfare’’
was avoided as being too broad and ambiguous. In addition, the literature
provides a highly divergent array of deﬁnitions and approaches of the
concept of animal welfare ranging from highly subjective to as objective as
possible, and from biological to philosophical, see for example Broom
(1999), Wemelsfelder (1999), and De Tavernier (2001). We chose a simple,
chieﬂy ethologically based approach. Taking center place is the view of most
stakeholder groups that the quality of life as perceived by the animal is the
main aspect of doing good to farm animals. The working hypothesis was
that animals would experience life as good if kept in a way that satisﬁes all
their behavioral and physiological needs. This approach was adopted from
Bracke (2001, and Anonymous, 2001), based on the assumption that
meeting the needs of the animals produces satisﬁed animals. Put into the
three-notion perspective as presented above: the group chose the ‘‘no suf-
fering’’ argument as their sole design target.
The implications of the animals’ needs were analyzed, especially from a
biological/behavior–physiological point of view. Requirements were then
formulated for the living environment for pigs with accompanying man-
agement. Analysis and design focused on the quality of life for the animals,
and deliberately ignored other socially relevant notions of dealing with
animals. Participating stakeholders were well aware of this. As could be
expected, other dimensions expressed in terms such as naturalness, intrinsic
value, respect, species-speciﬁc husbandry environments, and public image
came up repeatedly. Scientists and stakeholders alike withstood the temp-
tation to include consequences of these notions in the system’s design. The
resulting product was a brochure and public statement from the groups
involved to the eﬀect that ‘‘a good life for pigs is practicable.’’
The most important impact of the study aﬀected the range of thought
and follow-up initiatives adopted by major stakeholders and headed by a
new consortium of the largest animal protection organization and the
largest farmers organization in the Netherlands. Despite their separate
strategies, the parties unanimously agreed that reduction of suﬀering was
the primary problem in pig production needing solving, and were willing to
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participate in joint initiatives in the endeavor to accomplish this. This dem-
onstrated that the no-suﬀering notion indeed embraces a shared value and it
caused stakeholders to make public this value joint priority, paving the way
towards progress in the quest for socially acceptable farming practices.
4.1. From Support for the No-Suﬀering Argument Towards Exploration
of the Next Argument
A major stakeholder group involved in the design process, an animal pro-
tection NGO, pointed out a major risk of this approach: a further increase of
an instrumental view on animals, neglecting the speciﬁc value of them as
living creatures (‘‘instrumentalization’’). They argued that, in an extreme
approach, a consequence of the no-suﬀering approach could even lead to a
plea for the removal of animals’ feelings to make their lives ‘‘good.’’ It was
inferred that the functioning of this value was at stake especially among
breeders and farmers. Putting this concern into the perspective of the pre-
sented concept, it implied a plea for not omitting the second notion. This
NGO’s concern overlapped the government’s desire to explore farmers’ views
of their obligations towards their animals. It resulted in an exploratory study
among farmers, putting the intrinsic value notion of the concept central.
5. INTRINSIC VALUE OF ANIMALS FROM A FARMER’S POINT
OF VIEW
To explore the degree to which farmers attribute an intrinsic value to their
animals, three focus group sessions were organized. The study was designed
to identify what the intrinsic value notion meant to the farmers, and how it
related to farmers’ views on animal welfare.
5.1. Group Selection
Three national farmers organizations were each asked to form a group of
6–10 pig farmers to discuss their attitudes towards their animals. As the
discussions dealt with more than routine farming practices, it was suggested
that the farmers’ partners should also be invited. The largest most general
organization (LTO) recruited eight individuals (among which were two
couples) from the northern, non-pig-dense part of the country. The National
Young Farmers Organization (NAJK) recruited ﬁve farmers from the
highly pig-intensive south of the country. The reactive, opponent National
Pig Farmers Union (NVV) delivered a group of four farmers from central
Netherlands. The last two groups were existing study groups, whereas not
all of the individuals in the ﬁrst group were acquainted with each other.
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5.2. Evening Discussion
Use of the term ‘‘welfare’’ was avoided in both the invitation and the
evening introduction. The farmers were invited to share their views on the
term ‘‘respect,’’ motivated by the argument that the Ministry of Agriculture
was interested in their views and opportunities on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR). After a short introduction, everyone was asked to
introduce themselves and their farm, saying what they were proud of. Then,
a ﬁxed set of subjects was discussed:
• What does ‘‘being a pig farmer’’ mean?
• What does the term ‘‘respect to (your) animals’’ mean to you?
• Does the term ‘‘respect’’ bear more weight than the ‘‘no-suﬀering’’
argument?
• What would you do if you could spend 100,000 euro on your ani-
mals?
The focus group leaders attempted to get the individual views of the par-
ticipants instead of allowing the group to work towards consensus.
5.3. Aptness of the Results
In view of the marked contrast between the three organizations and regions,
the results can be taken as indicative of a substantial portion of the Dutch
pig farmer population. Clearly, the sample cannot be perceived as repre-
sentative, since the participants were pre-selected on their willingness to
discuss this topic, and the national, regional, and organizational diﬀerences.
This non-representative character of the group composition was not thought
to be important to the qualitative research. Other methodological choices,
such as avoidance of the term welfare by the interviewers and strategies to
prevent or discern socially desirable answers, will not be worked out here.
5.4. Results
Brieﬂy, the key motives for being a farmer can be expressed by the
termsfreedom, care, and challenge. Economic drive did not emerge as being a
prime motive, but mentioned as a prerequisite for continuity. An interesting
example was a story about saving life-threatened individual pigs just for the
sake of the animal and for the satisfaction of the endeavor.
5.5. The Weight of the Term Respect
All examples and values that farmers spontaneously replied in answer to
‘‘respect for the animal’’ were related to the fact that farmers realized that
animals can suﬀer and that their role is to minimize this. Terms like
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‘‘welfare,’’ ‘‘good life,’’ and ‘‘suﬀering’’ spontaneously came up to explain
their views. The question of how to handle a dead animal was an exception
to this rule, the reason being that dead animals are treated diﬀerently than
‘‘inanimate objects.’’ Instead of dragging animals over the farmyard, for
instance, a vehicle is used to carry them. The underlying motive given,
however, was not to oﬀend outsiders rather than out of respect for the
animals, which ﬁts in with the third shared value of the three-notion concept
(non-appalling appearance). The farmers did not produce examples beyond
the suﬀering notion, but when explicitly urged to look for them, they came
up with far-fetched scenarios, such as genetic modiﬁcation and their norms
to maintain species-speciﬁc characteristics of farm animals.
The results imply that the intrinsic value concept plays no unique role in
farmers’ attitudes towards their animals, however, respect for animals is
synonymous with their view on animal welfare. Their attitude towards
animals is motivated by the ﬁrst notion: suﬀering should be avoided or
minimized. Being aware of how other societal groups perceive animals, they
adapt their procedures accordingly. Presumably, they unconsciously take
the non-appalling appearance into account primarily basing their notion of
‘‘doing good to animals’’ on their notion that animals should not suﬀer. It
must be said, however, that farmers’ views on their animals cannot be seen
as fully utilitarian. Staﬂeu et al. (2004) elaborate on this aspect. Concepts on
social and especially psychological strategies that play a role in these views
and attitudes (e.g., collective cognitive dissonance) will surely add to
understanding the group views on their own practices, but will not be
worked out here.
6. SOME EXTRA REMARKS ON ‘‘FARMERS VIEWS ON GOOD
WELFARE’’
Analysis of the views of farmers on ‘‘doing good to animals’’ in the three
sessions produces a fairly consistent result. The collective view is that pro-
vision of adequate supply, such as food and water together with a good
health care, makes good welfare, by deﬁnition. At detail level, adequate
(=common!) housing conditions are seen as part of that system. Expressed
thoughts behind this are that the animals serve a purpose and therefore it is
normal to balance their interests with those of the producer. However,
animals should not suﬀer, so a farmer’s role is to deliver good care as far as
possible to prevent avoidable suﬀering and normal practice with good
intentions are thought to be adequate.
Interestingly, the farmers were aware that their norms of dealing with
animals develop in time too. Individuals spontaneously judged the ban on
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tethering of sows as being legitimate. ‘‘Although that system was not good,
we thought it was normal.’’ Freedom to ‘‘express natural behavior’’ was
mentioned as the norm; the former system of tethering sows was seen as an
infringement. Current facilities and procedures were judged as being ade-
quate for pigs. When asked for a theoretical spending of 100,000 euro on
their animals, however, most of them chose more space for the animals. This
illustrates their view that current practices provide adequate living condi-
tions, but that improvements are possible and should be seen as an extra, a
luxury also attractive to the farmers themselves. Application of straw was
also mentioned as a non-essential but attractive improvement, for them and
their animals and also to relieve societal unease.
Current practices (including those superimposed by regulation) thus
seem to function as normative conduct for farmers. Furthermore, the norm
leans heavily on the intention: ‘‘you do what is reasonable and within the
bounds of possibility, meaning good welfare. If the actual outcome is dis-
appointing, it is not because of bad welfare, that’s life. You’ve done your
best.’’
The results from the exploratory study among farmers indicate a useful
basis for the design of value-based acceptable intensive animal husbandry
systems. The farmers’ professional values of entrepreneurship, care, and
challenge do not conﬂict with their obligations to their animals. Striving
towards providing their animals with a good life, especially through pro-
fessional care and adequate housing conditions, is easily convertible into
system requirements. The conﬂict between the farmers and the public is seen
as one of image and of interests rather than a deeply normative problem.
Over the past decade, European governments have chosen the no-suf-
fering option on behalf of the public by imposing husbandry requirements
through legislation. Surveying the farmers’ views on acceptable and desirable
practices on animals presented above, the incompatibility between govern-
mental legislative interventions and farmers’ views would appear to be less
than at ﬁrst glance. Principally, they are both reactions to the rationale of
good husbandry requirements for the animals. The results of the focus
groups indicate that the farmers adapt their norms to the legal standards
accordingly. However, this rational approach does not meet the notions
(image) that matter to the public. Intensive farming conditions will not meet
the public’s key desires and will, therefore, not be trusted as being ‘‘good for
the animals.’’ As the level of keeping the public informed is unavoidably
limited, a gap in both understanding and acceptance will remain.
Design eﬀorts based on the shared no-suﬀering notion, do not address
the aesthetic aspects that matter to the public. While the focus on the no-
suﬀering value approach is easy to communicate, its result is clearly diﬃcult
to sell to the public. A straightforward reasoning is that solutions based on
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the approach will result in (NGO-) tolerated husbandry systems, but not in
desired, attractive solutions.
7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
The strategy to choose minimization of animal suﬀering as a priority when
designing acceptable animal husbandry strategies is eﬀective in a multi-
stakeholder environment, especially when adopting the underlying concept
of explicit distinction between and prioritization of the values. This ap-
proach can be seen as a way to enhance transparency in the farm animal
welfare debate. The key remaining challenge is to gain the public’s trust in
the hypothesis that legal farming practices based on no suﬀering are indeed
ethically defendable. Other notions such as naturalness and aesthetics also
come into play within certain stakeholder groups, but results indicate that
the animal-related values of farmers are predominantly related to the suf-
fering issue.
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